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ABSTRACT
This study explores the implications of shifting the narrative of climate policy
evaluation from one of costs/benefits or economic growth to a message of
improving social welfare. Focusing on the costs of mitigation and the associated
impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) may translate into a widespread concern
that a climate agreement will be very costly. This article considers the well-known
Human Development Index (HDI) as an alternative criterion for judging the welfare
effects of climate policy. We estimate what the maximum possible annual average
increase in HDI welfare per tons of CO2 would be within the carbon budget
associated with limiting warming to 2°C over the period 2015–2050. Emission
pathways are determined by a policy that allows the HDI of poor countries and
their emissions to increase under a business-as-usual development path, while
countries with a high HDI value (>0.8) have to restrain their emissions to ensure
that the global temperature rise does not exceed 2°C. For comparison, the well-
known multi-regional RICE model is used to assess GDP growth under the same
climate change policy goals.
Policy relevance
This is the first study that shifts the narrative of climate policy evaluation from one of
GDP growth to a message of improving social welfare, as captured by the HDI. This
could make it easier for political leaders and climate negotiators to publicly commit
themselves to ambitious carbon emission reduction goals, such as limiting global
warming to 2°C, as in the (non-binding) agreement made at COP 21 in Paris in
2015. We find that if impacts are framed in terms of growth in HDI per t CO2
emission per capita instead of in GDP, the HDI of poor countries and their
emissions are allowed to increase under a business-as-usual development path,
whereas countries with a high HDI (>0.8) must control emissions so that global
temperature rise remains within 2°C. Importantly, a climate agreement is more
attractive for rich countries under the HDI than the GDP frame. This is good news,
as these countries have to make the major contribution to emissions reductions.
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1. Introduction
The implications of changing the framing of climate policy from a perspective of economic growth impacts to a
message of improving social welfare are explored here. This involves quantifying alternative metrics for better
approximating welfare effects. Such an approach might make it easier for political leaders and climate
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negotiators to publicly commit themselves to ambitious carbon emission reduction goals (van den Bergh, 2010).
Many of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) before
Paris were arguably unsuccessful partly because of a focus on the costs of mitigation and the associated impacts
on gross domestic product (GDP) (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015). This translates into wide-
spread concern that a climate agreement will be very costly, although some debate this outcome. Even the
recent non-binding agreement reached at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Paris in
2015 involves national pledges (i.e. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) that are far from sufficient
to limit global warming to less than 2 or 1.5°C, but instead are expected to lead to median warming of 2.7°C,
with an uncertainty range of 2.2–3.4°C (http://climateactiontracker.org), based on current pledges – which
may change over time. There is thus a need for further analysis of climate change and policy using better indi-
cators of social welfare. We consider the well-known HDI as an alternative criterion for judging the welfare
effects of climate policy. It captures other elements of social welfare in addition to GDP by including life expect-
ancy and education as measures of the standard of living (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP],
2014). Moreover, the HDI is better suited to capture important dimensions of welfare in developing countries,
including very poor nations (UNDP, 2014).
In climate change debate and policy analysis, health is a somewhat underestimated issue. More attention to it
might broaden the support for stringent, safe climate policy and an associated climate agreement, as it did for
the Montreal Protocol on phasing-out ozone-depleting substances. That health impacts from climate change
can be substantial is clear e.g. from the predicted increase in vector-borne diseases that may occur in developing
countries due to climate change (Dasgupta, 2016; Sutherst, 2004). Brooks, Adger, and Kelly (2005) estimate how
deaths from climate-related disasters are influenced by a broad range of indicators of the vulnerability of a
country to natural hazards. They find that among other factors, life expectancy (related to health) and education
– which are both part of the HDI – significantly correlate with deaths due to climate-related disasters, while GDP
has an insignificant correlation. In particular, countries that score low on components of the HDI, such as sub-
Saharan Africa, are particularly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. The direct connection of climate change
and policy with education is less clear. Education may help people to be better prepared for, and thus adapt to,
climate change (Anderson, 2012). It has been found that the correlations between CO2 emissions and education
and life expectancy are weaker than with GDP (Costa, Rybski, & Kropp, 2011). This suggests that shifting (other)
GDP activities to education and health care would limit GHG emissions.
GDP is the monetary, market value of all final goods and services produced over a period of a year. It is avail-
able in a standardized form for most countries over a long period of time, which contributes to its popularity in
politics and the media, as well as its widespread use in economic studies. But it has serious shortcomings as an
indicator of social welfare, development or progress that are well documented (e.g. Arrow et al., 1995; van den
Bergh, 2009; Costanza et al., 2014; Daly & Cobb, 1989; Mishan, 1967; Victor, 2010). Among others issues, GDP
does not capture the saturation of individual welfare income or consumption, relative welfare effects (status),
inequity, the shifting of informal activities to formal markets (typical of development processes in poorer
countries), the depletion of natural resources, the impairment of human health due to problems such as pol-
lution and the degradation of the environment.
Most economic studies on climate policy conceptualize the problem as a trade-off between the benefits of a
policy and its costs1 measured by the reduced GDP (Hope, 2011; Nordhaus, 2008; Tol, 2009). But if the latter is
not a good gauge of changes in social welfare, as is notably the case for the richer countries with incomes above
the threshold where income barely contributes to higher welfare (related to happiness), then the real welfare
costs of climate policy are likely to be overestimated.
Here we consider the HDI as an alternative to GDP for various reasons. It is a better representation of social
welfare and plays an important role in (inter)national policies aimed at development and poverty reduction.2
Unmitigated climate change and climate policy affect a country’s HDI in complex ways. For example, it has
been suggested that climate change impacts, such as an increase in the frequency and severity of natural dis-
asters, can limit or reverse improvements in the HDI over time, especially for vulnerable poor countries (Akanbi,
Adagunodo, & Satope, 2014; UNDP, 2011, 2014), but improving the HDI can reduce vulnerability to climate
impacts (Brooks et al., 2005). In addition, the HDI can serve as an indicator of a country’s exposure to
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climate-related extremes in the sense that countries with a medium HDI experience the largest climate-related
disaster impacts, whereas countries with a high HDI suffer to a much lower degree (Patt et al., 2010).
Empirical information on the current HDI levels of countries is summarized in Table 1. Rich countries do not
differ much in their HDI values (0.87–0.94). Low-, medium- and high-HDI countries show a wider range: the
lowest-ranked countries, which are in Sub-Saharan Africa, have an HDI value of 0.5, medium-ranked countries
about 0.61 and high-ranked nations about 0.73 (UNDP, 2014). In addition, the HDI tends to increase for most
countries over time: by very little for rich countries, but by a much larger amount for poorer countries.
The new approach presented in this study aims to quantify how much welfare growth is possible
under a GHG emissions pathway that limits the global average temperature rise to 2°C. We will compare
this with a policy that maximizes world GDP. One particular concept and indicator that will be used is
the welfare per unit of carbon emissions, to capture the welfare productivity of carbon emissions.3 For
the HDI analysis, we build upon the empirical approach used by Costa et al. (2011), who examine the impli-
cations of climate policy that reduces emissions in line with a target of limiting global temperature increase
to 2°C. The proposed climate policy framework allows developing countries to follow the development
path taken by developed countries, while developed countries (with a HDI value >0.8) reduce their per
capita emissions on the basis of a reduction rate that increases proportionally with HDI4 and keeps total
emissions within the allowed limit of 2°C temperature rise with a 75% probability (Meinshausen et al.,
2009). We apply this framework to reframe climate policy impacts in terms of HDI changes, which allows
us to determine the growth rate of HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita when climate policy limits temperature
rise to 2°C.
2. Methods
2.1. HDI calculations
We use data from Costa et al. (2011) who derive CO2 emission pathways that are compatible with a climate
policy that limits the global temperature rise to 2°C and maximizes the HDI. The following three steps are
taken to calculate the HDI changes under allowable CO2 emissions that underlie our climate policy frames.
2.1.1. Step 1
For each country the yearly HDI level between 2015 and 2050 is calculated on the basis of a development-as-
usual (DAU) path (Costa et al., 2011). On average the total HDI increase in this period is 14.59% and the yearly
average HDI growth rate is 0.38%.
2.1.2. Step 2
The annual CO2 emissions per capita from burning fossil fuels that Costa et al. (2011) report for five-year intervals
(under a climate policy that limits warming up to 2°C) are used to calculate yearly per capita emission for
Table 1. HDI by regions and groups.
Human development group or region
HDI value
2010 2013
Very high human development 0.885 0.890
High human development 0.723 0.735
Medium human development 0.601 0.614
Low human development 0.479 0.493
Arab States 0.675 0.682
East Asia and the Pacific 0.688 0.703
Europe and Central Asia 0.726 0.738
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.734 0.740
South Asia 0.573 0.588
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.468 0.502
World 0.693 0.702
Source: UNDP (2014).
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countries between 2015 and 2050, based on a linear extrapolation of emissions. Costa et al. (2011) derived these
emissions as follows. A DAU HDI path is generated for each country to 2050, as well as the corresponding per
capita emissions of CO2 from burning fossils resulting from emissions’ positive correlation with the income com-
ponent of HDI. This results in global cumulative CO2 emissions for the period 2000–2050. Next, the DAU scenario
is used as a baseline for designing emission pathways that maximize the HDI and constrain the temperature rise
to 2°C. Emission budgets are estimated for groups of countries defined as developing (HDI<0.8) or developed
(HDI>0.8) in order to identify emissions as being necessary for development or as occurring after development
(Supplementary Table 1). The HDI framework is then used to allocate allowed CO2 emissions that the tempera-
ture rise is limited to 2°C (Supplementary Tables 1 and 2).5
2.1.3. Step 3
The generated information about the yearly HDI from step 1 and about emissions from step 2 are combined to
calculate a time series (2015–2050) of yearly HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita for each country. The resulting
variable can increase or decline over time: the HDI of a country increases, while per capita emissions can increase
as well if the country is still in a phase of development, or emissions can decline if it has reached the threshold
HDI. Finally, the annual average growth in the HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita is derived for each country to
create climate policy targets for the various regions, as well as a world average. This average yearly growth
of HDI per tCO2 per capita indicator over the 35-year period is calculated using:
HDIi, t=2050
Ci,t=2050
/
HDIi,t=2015
Ci,t=2015
( ) 1
35
( )
− 1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎠× 100,
where HDIi,t is the HDI level of country i at year t and Ci,t is the emission of CO2 per capita of country i at year t.
2.2. GDP calculations
Weobtain results for theGDP frameusing the regional integratedmodel of climate and the economy (RICE)model
developed by Nordhaus (2010). This is a multi-regional integrated assessment model (IAM) that divides the world
into 12 regions. We calculate RICE results for a climate policy scenario that limits global warming to 2°C. This
involves three steps. First, we calculate for each RICE region the annual GDP between 2015 and 2050. For this
we use the RICE results for the variable ‘Net National Income’, which is closely related to GDP. Second, the econ-
omically optimal annual CO2 emissions
6 of RICE per decade under the climate policy that limits warming up to 2°C
are used to calculate annual per capita emission per country between 2015 and 2050, based on a linear extrapol-
ation of the total emissions and dividing these by population to obtain per capita emissions. RICE emissions
include all GHG emissions7 and are reported in gigatons of carbon, which is converted here to tCO2. This
results in worldwide average per capita CO2 emissions over this period of about 3.7 t yr
–1. Third, the information
generated about GDP from step 1 and about emissions from step 2 are combined to calculate a time series (2015–
2050) of annual feasible GDP per tCO2 emitted per capita for each region. This is calculated using the formula
GDPt/per capita CO2 emissionst. A per capita representation is used to correct this welfare indicator for population
size. This variable increases over time because of both growth in GDP and the required decline in per capita emis-
sion to limit temperature rise to 2°C. Finally, the annual average growth in the GDP per tCO2 emitted per capita is
calculated for each RICE region to create reframed climate policy targets for these regions, from which a world
average can be derived. This average annual growth (in %) of GDP per tCO2 per capita indicator over the 35
year period is determined using the formula:
GDPi, t=2050
Ci,t=2050
/
GDPi,t=2015
Ci,t=2015
( ) 1
35
( )
− 1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎠× 100,
where GDPi,t is theGDP of country i at year t. This GDP frame represents the average annual feasible growth inGDP
CLIMATE POLICY 79
per tCO2 per capita between 2015 and 2050 that can be obtained under the proposed climate policy to keep
global warming below 2°C.
3. Results
3.1. HDI calculations
The results take the form of annual average growth in the HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita for each country to
create reframed climate policy targets per region, and can be aggregated into a world average, which equals
7.37% between 2015 and 2050.
Table 2 (left column) provides illustrative examples of how these results differ by country. The mean value of
7.37% is influenced by several relatively high values, as the median of 5.66% indicates. These growth rates are
the combined result of a generally modest increase in the numerator of this indicator (HDI) and a decline in the
denominator for high-HDI countries (i.e. a decline in the CO2 emitted per capita) such as the US; or an increase in
the denominator for low-HDI countries (CO2 emitted per capita to allow for business as usual development) such
as Tanzania. Note that emissions are allowed to increase in low-HDI countries as this is compatible with maxi-
mizing the HDI as proposed by Costa et al. (2011). If the effect of increasing emissions dominates the increase in
HDI growth then the growth of this indicator is negative, as is the case for Tanzania, and to a lesser degree, India.
It could be said that greater emissions are required to reach an improved HDI value.
These HDI-based results indicate that there is a dividing line between rich and poor countries. To further illus-
trate this, the highest scores for the growth in HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita between 2015 and 2050 are
reached for Luxemburg, Norway, Australia and Ireland (all more than 22%), while Chad and Benin have the
lowest values (−5.79% and −3.44%, respectively). In addition, other countries with a value of 20% or higher
are all rich countries (with a high HDI value): Canada, Spain, New Zealand, France, Singapore, Finland, the US,
Sweden, Austria, Belgium, the Republic of Korea, Italy, Netherlands, Iceland, South Africa and the UK. On the
other hand, countries with a value below −1% are mainly poor countries with a low HDI value: Ethiopia,
Yemen, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Uganda, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Chad, Nepal, Senegal,
Myanmar, Tanzania, Congo and Namibia. These findings indicate that the feasible HDI per tCO2 emitted per
capita can differ considerably between countries.
3.2. GDP calculations
Here we present the results of applying the RICE model (Nordhaus, 2010) to frame the results of climate policy in
terms of GDP increases, notably to arrive at a feasible maximal growth rate of GDP per tCO2 emitted per capita
(Methods). The RICE model estimates emission pathways that maximize world GDP. The calculations are pre-
sented as the annual average growth in the GDP per tCO2 emitted for each RICE region between 2015 and
2050 that can be obtained under the proposed climate policy to keep global warming below 2°C. Taking the
average of the regional-level results gives a value of 4.62%. Table 2 (right column) illustrates how results
differ between countries and regions.
Table 2. Country examples of the feasible growth rate of the HDI (left column) and GDP (right column) per tCO2 emitted per capita under a
proposed climate policy to limit global warming to 2°C.
Region or country HDI GDP
World/average 7.37% 4.62%
US 20.45% 4.40%
China 10.03% 5.19%
India −0.95% 4.42%
Russia 1.27% 4.93%
Africa n.a. 6.84%
Tanzania −1.93% n.a.
Notes: While the GDP results are shown for the African region (which is one of the RICE regions), such regional results are not available for our
country level HDI analysis. Instead we provide the results of Tanzania as an illustrative example for this region; n.a.: not applicable.
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All of the RICE regions experience positive growth in GDP per tCO2 emitted per capita between 2015 and
2050. This is the outcome of both an increase in the numerator of this indicator (GDP) and a decline in its
denominator (CO2 emitted per capita). Emissions decline in all regions because this is compatible with maximiz-
ing world GDP under the 2°C temperature limit. These results show that the feasible GDP per tCO2 emitted per
capita can be quite similar between countries that have very different economies and income levels (like the US,
China and Russia). The result for the African region can be understood as there being still many relatively low-
carbon opportunities here for GDP growth.
3.3. Comparison
Differences between the GDP and HDI results in Table 2 are due to the emission pathways used for the GDP and
HDI frames being based on distinct objectives, namely climate policy maximizing GDP and HDI, respectively.
Figures 1 and 2 respectively show the HDI and GDP per tCO2 emitted per capita between 2015–2050 under
the 2°C temperature limit. The vertical axes are on a logarithmic scale for the purpose of readability.
It can be noticed from Table 2 that for developing countries the rate of growth in GDP per tCO2 emitted per
capita is in general higher than that for the HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita. The latter does not take high values
or can even be negative, as in the case of Tanzania, due to higher CO2 emissions in these countries to lift them
out of poverty. This is consistent with the policy objective proposed by Costa et al. (2011), namely to allow these
countries to continue to emit to maximize their HDI. Figure 1 shows that the HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita
declines continuously over time. One might consider such countries as having had a low historical capacity to
transform emissions to HDI. Welfare increases from CO2 emissions in GDP terms in poor countries are
Figure 1. Time series of HDI per tCO2 emitted per capita between 2015–2050 under a proposed climate policy to limit global warming to 2°C.
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overestimated if the correct objective is HDI growth. It is therefore questionable to use changes in the GDP as a
guide for climate negotiations.
Considering specific countries, we find that the growth in HDI per tCO2 per capita for Russia is slightly positive
(reflected in the trend in Figure 1), which is the result of a small increase in the HDI level from 0.81 to 0.82 com-
bined with declining emissions. On the other hand, for rich countries (like the US, which is a region in RICE) the
findings are reverse – i.e. the rate of growth in the HDI per tCO2 per capita emission for such countries is high
compared with the similar rate of growth in GDP. This is reflected in the stronger HDI per CO2 emissions trend in
Figure 1 for the US than the GDP per CO2 emissions in Figure 2. This means that a climate agreement will appear
more attractive for such countries if it is framed in terms of growth in HDI per capita CO2 emission. The results for
rich countries are driven by the large emission reductions that are needed in these countries to stimulate HDI
growth worldwide – which also applies to the GDP results, albeit to a smaller extent. This outcome holds for the
world as a whole, as the average is dominated by that of the rich countries.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This study shows how a reframing of climate policy from GDP to welfare terms can be quantitatively tested, as
illustrated by the HDI. The HDI analysis indicates that a 2°C limit to the global temperature rise offers opportu-
nities and space for welfare growth in poor countries. In particular, 61 countries are lifted out of poverty by 2050
(HDI≥0.8) (Costa et al., 2011). At that point they will have to cut emissions. Of course the exact value of the
adopted threshold of welfare is open to debate, but the value of 0.8 seems to be a reasonable reference
Figure 2. Time series of GDP (in US$ trillion) per t CO2 emitted per capita between 2015–2050 under a proposed climate policy to limit global
warming to 2°C.
82 J. VAN DEN BERGH AND W. J. W. BOTZEN
value (Costa et al., 2011). Moreover, the RICE model results show that under a 2°C temperature rise limit, welfare
growth for poor countries (like the African region) can also be obtained in terms of the more narrow per-capita
GDP metric, even though the cost–benefit analysis of RICE shows that such a stringent climate policy is not
optimal in GDP terms (Nordaus, 2010).
In summary, both HDI and GDP indicators show that development is compatible with the 2°C target. For poor
countries, one advantage of evaluating climate policy using the HDI metric is that maximizing the HDI implies
that they have to cut emissions later and, thereby benefit from being lifted out of poverty. An advantage for
richer countries, like the US, who traditionally have been reluctant to implement stringent climate policies is
that the HDI welfare growth in terms of per capita CO2 is high relative to that for GDP.
Our analysis suggests that all countries – both low- and high-HDI – have to work towards low-carbon devel-
opment while countries with an HDI value above 0.8 would need to provide the means of implementation or
capacity-building for the low-HDI countries, e.g. through technology transfer and finance. On top of this,
high-HDI countries should move as quickly as is feasible in the direction of low (‘zero’)-carbon intensity.
To improve this study, it would be helpful to have an adjusted HDI that also covers income inequality within
countries, as this is likely to be strongly affected by climate change as well as climate policy. In performing this
analysis, we were limited by the fact that the RICE model produces estimates for a limited number of (rather
homogeneous) multi-country regions instead of for all of the individual countries. In addition, while the RICE
model is based on theoretical, stylized pathways of GDP growth, the approach in Costa et al. (2011) is
simpler and more empirical in nature. A more detailed and consistent comparison at the country level would
require a similar but more disaggregated model.
It will not be easy to convince economists, policy makers and politicians – who habitually use GDP infor-
mation – to replace this with an alternative that serves as a better proxy of welfare, whether the HDI or
another measure. The fierce debate following The Stern Review (Stern, 2007), particularly with regards to dis-
counting practices (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2008, 2013; Tol & Yohe, 2007), indicates that one can expect
strong resistance to efforts to change evaluation procedures and performance indicators. Likewise, moving
away from monetary indicators like GDP (per capita) in climate impact and policy analysis can be expected
to meet with opposition. But perhaps climate change can act as the critical driver to let go of the current
GDP growth paradigm. This paradigm is widely regarded as the most significant environmental challenge to
continued economic growth, but the debate on growth versus climate is also likely to intensify in coming
years as the remaining carbon budget associated with the 2°C goal will rapidly decline.
One way forwards may be to evaluate climate policy using a broad set of indicators, including the HDI, to
provide additional relevant information about welfare implications. A credible alternative for GDP may facilitate
a transition away from the GDP growth focus. However, although the HDI is better than GDP in this context, it is
not a perfect welfare proxy either (Hicks, 1997; Neumayer, 2001; Noorbakhsh, 1998; Sagar & Najam, 1998). One
might thus want to use a more ideal welfare index (Botzen & van den Bergh, 2014). However, there are no con-
sistent country data available for any alternative. For the foreseeable future, the HDI is as good as it gets.
Notes
1. For a recent review of the cost of climate change, see van den Bergh and Botzen (2015).
2. An additional advantage of this choice over other alternatives to GDP is that annual country-level data is available since 1990. It
should be noted that the way the HDI is computed has slightly changed from 2010 onwards (UNDP, 2010).
3. A related concept is ‘GDP carbon productivity’, which means the amount of GDP produced per unit of carbon dioxide equiv-
alent (CO2e) emissions (McKinsey, 2008). Increasing this productivity is considered as the strategy to match economic growth
and climate change goals.
4. As explained in Costa et al. (2011) a country’s i per capita emissions e at year t are expressed as (1−ri,t)ei,t where the reduction
rate ri,t = f (di,t – d*) for di,t > d* of which di,t is the HDI level at time t, d* is the development threshold of 0.8 and f is the pro-
portionality constant (set at 3.3).
5. This approach focuses on estimating emissions where they occur and therefore does not make adjustments for the emissions
embodied in trade, such as the differences between where emissions are produced and the resulting goods are consumed.
6. Figure 1 in Nordhaus (2010) shows the RICE emission pathway that limits warming to 2°C, which is broadly similar to the RCP2.6
scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
7. Nevertheless, CO2 makes up the majority of these emissions (Nordhaus, 2010).
CLIMATE POLICY 83
Acknowledgements
This article is the outcome of a study on ‘Maximizing welfare levels while reducing carbon footprints’ undertaken for WWF. We are
grateful to Luis Costa for providing the data of his study on the human development index and climate policy, and for providing
detailed comments on the text. We have benefitted from detailed feedback by Jaco Du Toit, Patrick Hofstetter, Tabaré Currás and
Louise Naude of the WWF. This article, its conclusions, and any views expressed therein do, however, not necessarily represent
the views or positions of the WWF.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by WWF International.
References
Akanbi, B. E., Adagunodo, M., & Satope, B. F. (2014). Climate change, human development and economic growth in Nigeria.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 4(13), 222–228.
Anderson, A. (2012). Climate change education for mitigation and adaptation. Journal of Education for Sustainable Development, 6,
191–206.
Arrow, K. J., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C. S.,… Pimentel, D. (1995). Economic growth, carrying capacity, and
the environment. Science, 268, 520–521.
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2009). The GDP paradox. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 117–135.
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2010). Relax about GDP growth: Implications for climate and crisis policies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 18,
540–543.
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., & Botzen, W. J. W. (2015). Monetary valuation of the social cost of CO2 emissions: A critical survey. Ecological
Economics, 114, 33–46.
Botzen, W. J. W., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2014). Specifications of social welfare in economic studies of climate policy: Overview of
criteria and related policy insights. Environmental and Resource Economics, 58, 1–33.
Brooks, N., Adger, W. N., & Kelly, P. M. (2005). The determinants of vulnerability and adaptive capacity at the national level and the
implications for adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 15, 151–163.
Costa, L., Rybski, D., & Kropp, J. P. (2011). A human development framework for CO2 reductions. PLoS ONE, 6, e29262–1–9.
Costanza, R., Kubiszewski, I., Giovannini, E., Lovins, H., McGlade, J., Pickett, K. E.,…Wilkinson, R. (2014). Development: Time to leave
GDP behind. Nature, 505, 283–285.
Daly, H. E., & Cobb, J. (1989). For the common good: Redirecting the economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable
future. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Dasgupta, P. (2016). Climate sensitive adaptation in health. Berlin: Springer.
European Parliamentary Research Service. (2015). Negotiating a new UN climate agreement: Challenges on the road to Paris. Brussel:
European Parliamentary Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/551347/
EPRS_IDA(2015)551347_EN.pdf
Hicks, D. A. (1997). The inequality-adjusted human development index: A constructive proposal. World Development, 25, 1283–1298.
Hope, C. (2011). The social cost of CO2 from the PAGE09 model. Economics, Discussion Paper No. 2011-39. Retrieved from: http://www.
economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2011-39.
McKinsey. (2008). The carbon productivity challenge: Curbing climate change and sustaining economic growth. London: McKinsey Global
Institute.
Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., Hare, W., Raper, S. C. B., Frieler, K., Knutti, R.,… Allen, M. R. (2009). Greenhouse gas emission targets
for limiting global warming to 2°C. Nature, 458, 1158–1162.
Mishan, E. J. (1967). The cost of economic growth. London: Staples Press.
Neumayer, E. (2001). The human development index and sustainability: A constructive proposal. Ecological Economics, 39, 101–114.
Noorbakhsh, F. (1998). The human development index: Some technical issues and alternative indices. Journal of International
Development, 10, 589–605.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). Comments on the Stern review. In: Yale symposium on the Stern review, chapter 5. Yale Center for the Study of
Globalization. Retrieved from http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/SternReviewYaleSymposium2007.pdf
Nordhaus, W. D. (2008). A question of balance: Weighting the options of global warming policies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2010). Economic aspects of global warming in a post-Copenhagen environment. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the USA, 107, 11721–11726.
84 J. VAN DEN BERGH AND W. J. W. BOTZEN
Patt, A., Tadross, M., Nussbaumer, P., Asante, K., Metzger, M., et al. (2010). Estimating least-developed countries vulnerability to climate-
related extreme events over the next 50 years. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 107, 1333–1337.
Sagar, A. D., & Najam, A. (1998). The human development index: A critical review. Ecological Economics, 25, 249–264.
Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stern, N. (2008). Richard T. Ely lecture: The economics of climate change. American Economic Review, 98(2), 1–37.
Stern, N. (2013). The structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of climate change: Grafting gross underestimation of
risk onto already narrow science models. Journal of Economic Literature, 51, 838–859.
Sutherst, R. W. (2004). Global change and human vulnerability to vector-borne diseases. Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 17, 136–173.
Tol, R. S. J. (2009). The economic effects of climate change. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, 29–51.
Tol, R. S. J., & Yohe, G. W. (2007). Climate change – a stern reply to the reply to the review of the Stern Review.World Economics, 8, 153–
159.
UNDP. (2010). Human development report 2010. The real wealth of nations: Pathways to human development. New York: United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP).
UNDP. (2011). Human development report 2011. Sustainability and equity: A better future for all. New York: Author.
UNDP. (2014). Human development report 2014. Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience. New York:
Author.
Victor, P. (2010). Questioning economic growth. Nature, 468, 370–371.
CLIMATE POLICY 85
